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Abstract. In this article, we will show that uncomputability is a rel-
ative property not only of oracle Turing machines, but also of subre-
cursive classes. We will define the concept of a Turing submachine, and
a recursive relative version for the Busy Beaver function which we will
call Busy Beaver Plus function. Therefore, we will prove that the com-
putable Busy Beaver Plus function defined on any Turing submachine
is not computable by any program running on this submachine. We
will thereby demonstrate the existence of a “paradox” of computability
a la Skolem: a function is computable when “seen from the outside”
the subsystem, but uncomputable when “seen from within” the same
subsystem. Finally, we will raise the possibility of defining universal
submachines, and a hierarchy of negative Turing degrees.
1. Introduction
In first place, we must briefly introduce the ideas behind the definitions,
concepts and theorems exposed in the present article. It is true that, fol-
lowing an interdisciplinary course of study, this work focuses on manifold
inspirations coming from several different fields of knowledge. However,
for present purposes it is essential to mention the two foremost: Skolem’s
“paradox” and metabiology.
Skolem’s “paradox” derives from Cantor’s famous theorem on the un-
countablity of infinite sets, for instance of real numbers or of the set of all
subsets of natural numbers, and also from Lo¨wenheim-Skolem’s theorem on
the size of models in satisfiable theories. Briefly, the “paradox” is: there is a
countably infinite model for a theory (e.g. ZFC, if we accept it as consistent)
that proves there are uncountably infinite sets. Therefore, when we look at
the set of elements in the theory’s model which correspond homomorphi-
cally to the elements in the set that the theory demonstrates contain an
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uncountable amount of elements, may however contain a countable amount
of elements. Does this contradiction represent, in fact, a paradox?
That question was answered by Skolem in 1922, being that the property
of countability of real numbers depends on the existence of a function within
the model that makes this bijective enumeration. This function cannot exist
within any ZFC model - if that is the chosen axiomatic system - because, if
it existed, it would render countable the set of all real numbers. However, it
may exist when seen “from the outside”, when this function never belongs
to the model. In other words, the function that “bijects” the natural onto
the real numbers never belongs to any model of any Set Theory1 - but exists
nevertheless. Thus, it is understood that this does not constitute a true
paradox. It forms what one may call a pseudoparadox: when seen “from
the outside”, an object has a certain property, but when seen seem “from
within” it has the opposite property. For this reason, it makes sense to
call the Skolem’s “paradox” a pseudoparadox of countability. Therefore,
one may ask the question: just as there is a pseudoparadox of countability,
could there be a pseudoparadox of computability? We will address this
subject in the present paper.
Metabiology is a field of theoretical computer science with a transdisci-
plinary “heart” that studies general principles of biological relations at a
meta-level focusing on the open-ended evolution of systems and is inspired
by both the theories of biological evolution and by algorithmic informa-
tion theory (AIT). While the already developed and well-established fields
of population genetics and evolutionary computations are driven towards
simulations of evolutionary populations and statistical properties of those
populations, metabiology is driven towards achieving theorems. It uses all
available tools from theory of computation, algorithmic information and
metamathematics to build and study abstract models – applicable or not.
Unlike the first models made by Chaitin, if we want a “nature” without
access to oracles - at least, without access to real oracles - it needs to be
a system that can be completely simulated on a universal Turing machine,
or on a sufficiently powerful computer. This would also allow us to do
experimental computer simulations on the evolution of digital organisms in
the future.
In attempting to create a metabiological nature which is computable,
but that “behaves in the same way” as an oracular one, i.e., in the same
way as an uncomputable nature - in other words, as a hypercomputer - we
face a series of difficulties. The first, highlighted in the literature, is the
absence of a program that will solve the halting problem. This is required
to determine whether or not an algorithmic mutation will result in a new
organism/program (a mutation’s output given by a prior organism as input)
and whether or not the organism/program has a higher fitness (its output)
than the previous one. A computable nature would necessarily need to be
capable of running a function capable of accomplishing this task, which we
know is impossible for any arbitrary program. Note also that solving the
halting problem, computing the bits of a Chaitin number Ω, and computing
the Busy Beaver function, are equivalently uncomputable problems of Turing
1 Of course, provided it is strong enough and satisfiable.
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degree 0′. How would evolution, then, occur within a computable simulation
of “Nature”?
However, this paper does not intend to present mathematical exercises in
metabiology, but to focus on presenting the elements which allow proving a
computable metabiological model: “sub-uncomputability”. The present
paper comes from a solution we gave to the question to the above, as shown
in [4]. We intend to demonstrate several fruitful properties and raise issues
for future study within the mathematics of theoretical computer science.
Basically, we will call a Turing submachine any Turing machine that
always gives an output for any input, i.e. always halts. The prefix “sub”
parallels the term subrecursion. A subrecursive class is one defined by a
proper subset of the set of all problems with Turing degree 0. Therefore, a
subcomputable class of problems will be subrecursive, because it will never
contain all recursive/computable problems. The term subrecursion is also
used to characterize subrecursive hierarchies, as in Kleene and Grzegorczyk,
covering all primitive recursive functions. But for us, the prefix refers more
specifically to the concept of subrecursive class.
Note that Turing submachine is just another terminology for total Tur-
ing machines. However, despite the fact that they are just different names
for the same object and can be used interchangeably, the expression “to-
tal Turing machine” might not immediately capture its relevant properties
related to the present paper.
Every total computable function (or total Turing machine) defines a sub-
recursive class which is a proper subclass of other subrecursive classes (and
of the class of all recursive functions). For example, the total Turing machine
will be a subsystem of another total machine which is capable of comput-
ing functions that are relatively uncomputable by the former. This very
idea of being part of another non-reducibly more powerful machine – that
comes from sub-uncomputability, as we will show – is the core notion of the
expression “submachine”, conveying and bearing the ideas of hierarchies of
subrecursive classes together with the powerful concept of Turing machines.
Thus, the terminology Turing submachine emphasizes this property of total
Turing machines being always able to be part of another proper and bigger
machine. For more of this discussion, see item 4.
The central theme is building, or rather proving, a system (a Turing ma-
chine) that can “behave” in relation to a subsystem (its Turing submachine)
in the same way as a hypercomputer (an oracle Turing machine) would be-
have in relation to a subsystem (in particular, a universal Turing machine).
In fact, we will not emulate all - which might be impossible - the proper-
ties of a hypercomputer in relation to a computer, but focus on defining
a function BB+P ′T (N) analogous to a Busy Beaver function (in Chaitin’s
work, function BB′(N)), so that this function will behave in relation to the
Turing submachine in the “same” way as the original Busy Beaver behaves
in relation to a universal Turing machine. In other words, BB+P ′T (N)
must be relatively uncomputable by any subprogram (a program running
on a Turing submachine), the same way the original Busy Beaver is un-
computable by any program running on a universal Turing machine. This
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phenomenon will be called recursive relative uncomputability, or sub-
uncomputability.
2. Language L
The first important definition that needs to be established is the very
programming, or universal machine, language with which we will work. It
is important to us that the submachine UP ′T must be programmable. This
language can be used on any usual computer, that is, its properties and
rules of well-formation are programmable. Ultimately, this will lead us to
the conclusion that the phenomenon of subcomputation may occur “within”
computers as we already know them, which are universal Turing machines
with limited resources.
Why concatenations? They provide a direct way of symbolizing a pro-
gram taking any given bit string as input - for example, a program p that is,
actually, program p′ taking program p′′ as input - which makes this program
act as a function. Note that this type of program is already used to demon-
strate the halting problem, or demonstrate that the Busy Beaver function
is uncomputable. But the form it may assume is completely arbitrary, as
a universal Turing machine, in any case, will run it. Therefore, it is no
wonder we need this condition – this functionalizing special concatenation
- in our language. As we are trying to build a computer that can emulate
uncomputability, it is necessary that we can “teach” a machine to perform
and recognize these “concatenations” within the language it is working in.
Many of the properties of the language L, below, are not required for
this study; however, they were required to demonstrate the evolution of
metabiological subprograms a la Chaitin.
To differentiate from the optimal functionalizing concatenation, which is
joining strings in the most compressed way possible, provided it remains
well-formulated, this special functionalizing concatenation will be denoted
as “◦”, while the optimal functionalizing concatenation will be symbolized
as “∗”.
2.1. Definition. We say a universal programming language l, defined on a
universal Turing machine U , is recursively functionalizable if there is a
program that, given any bit strings P and w as inputs, will return a bit string
belonging to l which will be denoted as P ◦w, whereby U (P ◦ w) equals “the
result of the computation (on U) of program P when w is given as input”.
In addition, there must be a program that will determine whether or not a
bit string is in form P ◦ w for any P and w, and is capable of returning P
and w separately. Analogously, the latter must be true for the successive
concatenation P ◦w1◦· · ·◦wk, with program P receiving w1,. . .wk as inputs.
Now, the general definition of language L can be defined as: let U be a
universal Turing machine running language L, a universal language that is
binary, self-delimiting, recursive, and recursively functionalizable
and that there are constants ∈, C e C ′, for every P , w1,. . .wk, where:
|wi|< |P◦w1◦. . .◦wk| , for i= 1, 2, . . .or k
and
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|P◦w1◦. . .◦wk| ≤C×k+ |P |+ |w1|+|w2|+ · · ·+ |wk|
and
H (N)≤C ′+log2N +(1+ǫ) log2 (log2N )
3. Definitions
(a) W is the set of all finite bit strings, where the computable enumeration
of these bit strings has the form l1, l2, l3, ..., lk, ...
For practical purposes, a language may be adopted where l1 = 0.
(b) Let w ∈W .
|w| denotes the size or number of bits contained in w.
(c) Let N simply symbolize the corresponding program in language L for
the natural number N . For example, P ◦N denotes program P ◦w where
w is the natural number N in the language L.
(d) If function f is computable by program P , then f may also be called
function P .
4. Turing Submachines
A key concept in the present article is the idea that a subsystem can do
almost anything its system can, however, with resources limited by the very
system. We follow the conventional understanding in which a computation
that is a part of another computation may be called a subcomputation, and
a machine that is a part of another machine may be called a submachine.
In our case, a system can be taken as a Turing machine, and a subsystem
can be taken as a Turing submachine. For example, a Turing submachine
can be a program or subroutine that the “bigger” Turing machine runs, al-
ways generating an output, while performing various other tasks. Note that
it is true (a theorem) that for every total Turing machine there is another
Turing machine that completely emulates and contains the former total Tur-
ing machine, in a manner that the computations of the latter contains the
computations of the former.
In fact, we are using a stronger notion of subsystem based upon this
conventional notion: a subsystem must be only able do what the system
knows, determines and delimits. This way, submachines will only be those
machines for which there is another “bigger” machine that can decide what
is the output of the former and whether there is an output at all. Note that
every machine that falls under this definition always defines an equivalent
total Turing machine (with a signed output corresponding to the case
where the former does not halt); and every total Turing machine falls under
this definition.
We will use another concept of vital importance: computation time.
Similarly to time complexity, we will call T a program that calculates how
many steps or basic operations U performs when running program p. Thus,
if U(p) does not halt, then U(T ∗ p) will not halt either, and vice versa.
Let Pf be a program running on U defined in language L, computing a
total function (a function defined for all possible input values) f such that
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f : L −→ X ⊆ W . The language W does not need necessarily to be self-
delimiting, and may be comprised of all bit strings of finite size, as long as
they may be recursively enumerated in order, as l1, l2, l3,... For practical
reasons, we will choose an enumeration where l1 = 0.
A “Turing submachine” or total Turing machine U/f is defined
as a Turing machine in which, for every bit string w in the language of U ,
U/f (w) = U (Pf ◦ w).
This definition is quite general and transforms any total computable func-
tion into a Turing submachine. In fact, as said in the introduction, Turing
submachines are just another name for total Turing machines. Anyway,
Turing submachines can always be subsystems of either abstract universal
Turing machines or of powerful (big) enough everyday computers (which are
also some sort of total Turing machine, i.e. a universal Turing machine with
limited resources).
Note that the class of all submachines is infinite, but not recursive.
When we talk of subprograms we refer to programs run on a Turing
submachine. Herein, only submachines of a particular subclass will be dealt
with: submachines defined by a computation time limited by a computable
function2. In fact, both these and the more generic submachines defined
above are equivalent in computational power. To demonstrate this, just
note that if a program computes a total function, then there is a program
that can compute the computation time of this first program. Therefore,
for every computable and total function, there is a submachine with limited
computation time capable of computing this function – and, possibly, other
functions as well. The reverse follows from the definition of submachine.
Let PT be an arbitrary program that calculates a computation time for a
given program w. That is, let PT be an arbitrary total computable function.
Thus, there is aTuring submachine UPT defined by the computation-
time function P T .
We then define submachine U/PSM ◦ P T (which will be a program run-
ning on U that computes a total function), where PSM is a program that
receives PT and w as inputs, runs U(PT ◦ w) and returns:
(i) l1, if U(w) does not halt within computation time ≤ U(PT ◦ w);
(ii) lk+1, if U(w) halts within computation time ≤U(PT ◦w) e U(w) =lk;
This program defines a Turing submachine that returns a known symbol
(in this case, zero) when program w does not halt in time ≤ U (PT ◦ w) or
returns the same output (except for a trivial bijection) as U (w) when the
latter halts in time ≤ U(PT ◦ w).
To be a Turing submachine, U/PSM ◦ P T must be defined for all inputs.
This occurs because PT is total by definition. In addition, as computa-
tion time PT becomes more increasing, the more submachine U/PSM ◦ P T
approaches the universality of U .
Therefore, we will denote only as UPT a Turing submachine U/PSM ◦ P T ,
so that:
2 Or time-bounded Turing machines
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∀w ∈ L ( UPT (w)=U/PSM◦P T (w)=U (PSM◦PT ◦w) )
5. Function BB+P ′T (N)
Let P ′T be a total function. Let us define function BB
+
P ′T (N), which
we will call Busy Beaver Plus, through the following recursive procedure:
(i) Generate a list of all outputs of UP ′T (w) such that |w| ≤ N ;
(ii) Take the largest number on that list;
(iii) Add 1;
(iv) Return that value.
The name of this function refers to the Busy Beaver BB (N) function
and, consequently, it is no coincidence that the two have almost the same
definition. If step (iii) is removed, it becomes exactly the Busy Beaver
function for Turing submachines, here denoted as BBP ′T (N). Thus:
BB+ (N)=BB (N)+1
and
BB+P ′T (N)=BBP ′T (N)+1
But why use function BB+ instead of BB? This might be, one supposes,
the reader’s first and immediate question. As we are dealing with Turing
submachines and P ′T is arbitrary, it is possible there is a program on UP ′T
with size ≤ N such that computes the highest value returned by any other
program on UP ′T with size ≤ N . When dealing with a universal Turing
machine U , this cannot occur – except for a constant. However, with sub-
machines, it can. Thus, function BB+P ′T is triggered to assure it, in itself,
is not relatively computable - or compressible – by any program on UP ′T , al-
though it can be by a program on U . Since P ′T is a program that computes
a total function, then BB+P ′T (N) is computable.
The Busy Beaver contains the idea of the greatest output of any ≤ N sized
program; so the Busy Beaver Plus function contains the idea of increasing,
at least by 1, any ≤ N sized program. Respectively, the first gives us
maximization, and the second, an “almost” minimal increment.
Following this line of thought, to symbolize this new function, the image
may be evoked of the proverbial man sitting on a hungry donkey and driving
the animal by a carrot hanging from a fishing rod. As the carrot looms in
front of the donkey’s face, the hungry donkey is driven to walk forward to
reach the carrot, which is never reached. Not because it is an infinite distance
away, but because with every step it takes the carrot moves forward along
with it. The carrot is always “one step” ahead of the donkey. No matter
how dutifully the donkey walks toward the carrot, it will always remain at
the same distance, just beyond reach, unattainable. No matter how rapidly
increasing is the function P ′T , the program on U that computes BB
+
P ′T (N)
simply bases itself on the UP ′T outputs to overcome them by a minimum.
No matter how powerful UP ′T may be, BB
+
P ′T (N) will always be “one
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step” ahead of the best that any subprogram (i.e., any program UP ′T ) can
do.
It is worthy of note that, analogously to the Busy Beaver, theBB+P ′T (N)
may be used to measure the “creativity” or “sub-algorithmic complexity” of
the subprograms in relation to Turing submachine UP ′T . Why? By its
very definition, if a subprogram generates an output ≥ BB+P ′T (N), it
must necessarily be of size > N . It needs to have over N bits of relatively
incompressible information, i.e. over N bits of relative creativity.
Of course, one may always build a program that will compute func-
tion BB+P ′T (N), if function P
′
T is computable. This would allow a far
smaller program than N there to exist – e.g., of size ≤ C + log2N + (1 +
ǫ)log2(log2N ) – that will compute BB
+
P ′T (N). But that does not con-
stitute a contradiction, because this program can never be a subprogram of
UP ′T , in other words, it can never be a program that runs on the computation
time determined by P ′T . If it was, it would enter into direct contradiction
with the definition of BB+P ′T : the program P
′
T will become undefined for
an input, which by assumption is false. Then, as we will show in item 6, we
will immediately get the “paradox” of computability.
6. Sub-uncomputability: Recursive Relative Uncomputability
Now we will prove the crucial, yet simple, result that governs this paper.
Let P ′T be a total function and UP ′T a Turing submachine. Then, we
can prove that function BB+P ′T (N) is relatively uncomputable by any
program on UP ′T . Or: there is no subprogram that, for every input N ,
returns an output equal to BB+P ′T (N). Actually, BB
+
P ′T (N) eventually
dominates any program on UP ′T .
A more intuitive way to understand what is going on is to look for a pro-
gram and concatenate its input, such as UP ′T (P ∗N) for instance. Where
“∗” denotes the optimal functionalizing concatenation, and not necessar-
ily the “concatenation” “◦” defined in item 2. In fact, this applies to any
way to compress the information of P and N in an arbitrary subprogram.
Therefore, it may not be in the form P ◦N .
We avail ourselves of the same idea used in the demonstration of Chaitin’s
incompleteness theorem. Now, however, to demonstrate an uncomputability
relative to the submachine UP ′T .
When N is given as input to any program P , it comes in its compressed
form with size ∼= H (N) – in fact, we use the property
|P◦N | ≤C+|P |+C ′+log2N +(1+ǫ)log2(log2N )
whereby |P ◦N | ∼= C + H (N) . But, as already known by the AIT, for
any constant C there is a big enough N0 such that C + H (N0) < N0.
Therefore, according to the definition of BB+P ′T , the output of P ◦N0 when
run on submachine UP ′T , will be taken into account when one calculates
BB+P ′T (N0 ). Thus, necessarily,
BB+P ′T (N0 )≥UP ′T (P◦N0)+1 >UP ′T (P◦N0)
Which will lead to contradiction, if P computes BB+P ′T when running on
submachine UP ′T . The same holds for “∗”.
THE “PARADOX” OF COMPUTABILITY AND A RECURSIVE RELATIVE VERSION OF THE BUSY BEAVER FUNCTION9
Also, following the same argument, it can be shown promptly that BB+P ′T (N)
is a relatively incompressible, or sub-incompressible, function by any
subprogram smaller than or equal to N . That is, no program of size ≤ N
running on P ′T will result in an output larger than or equal to BB
+
P ′T (N).
7. Conclusion and Final Comments
First, a self-delimiting universal language L was defined for a universal
Turing machine U . Then, we defined the Turing submachines (or total Tur-
ing machines) UP ′
T
. It has been further demonstrated that the phenomenon
of “sub-uncomputability” is ubiquitous: for every Turing submachine UP ’T ,
if is a program that computes a total function, then the computable function
BB+P ′
T
(N) is relatively uncomputable by any program running on UP ’T in
the same manner that the Busy Beaver function BB′ (N) is in relation to any
program. Also, by the very definition of BB+P ′
T
, there cannot be any pro-
gram of size 6 N running on UP ’T that will generate an output higher than
or equal to BB+P ′
T
(N) – which may be called the sub-incompressibility of
the function BB+P ′
T
.
To recreate/relativize the classic uncomputability of the Busy Beaver
function, essentially, we had do to Turing and Rado´ the same as Skolem
did to Cantor: we relativized the uncomputability of function BB′ (N). It
was demonstrated that it depends on “being seen from the outside, or from
the inside”. Thus, it was proven that there is a “paradox” of computability
a la Skolem, i.e. there is a function that is computable if “seen from with-
out”, that is uncomputable if “seen from within”. As both language L and
the submachines can be programmed, this phenomenon can occur within
our everyday computers.
However, not “all uncomputabilities” of a first-order hypercomputer were
relativized in relation to a universal Turing machine. Only what was de-
scribed above was relativized. However, following this line of mathematical
inquiry enabled us to build metabiological evolutionary models that are fully
analogous to Chaitins models of Intelligent Design and Cumulative Evolu-
tion – as shown in [4]. For this purpose, a Turing submachine UP ∗∗T ◦PT
was built and a relative and computable Chaitin Omega number ΩP ∗∗T ◦PT
in the case, a time-limited halting probability was defined. Clauses were
added to UP ∗∗T ◦PT to allow the existence of finite lower approximations ρ
to ΩP ∗∗T ◦PT that can be used by a program P when running on UP ∗∗T ◦PT
to compute values of BB+P ∗∗T ◦PT (N), so that 2N + C > |P ◦ ρ| > N + 1,
where C is a constant. This was also designed to mimic what a universal
Turing machine can do with lower approximations to Ω with the purpose
of calculating values of BB′ (N). Also, another clauses were added to en-
able the relative versions of key mutations/programs from Chaitins models
to also become subprograms. Thus, the open-ended evolution of subpro-
grams revealed itself as isomorphically fast as the open-ended evolution of
programs. It allowed us to recursively relativize more “behaviors” of a first
order hypercomputer in relation to a computer, making them happen be-
tween machines and submachines.
An upcoming mathematical inquiry this article suggests is proving whether
or not there is a way to define - relatively - universal Turing submachines. A
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universal submachine should be analogous to a universal machine, so there
is a class of subcomputable problems, always reducible by subprograms (in
the case to the above, within a subcomputable time), that are computable
by this universal submachine. The questions would be: how to define a
computation time PU so that UPU is a universal Turing submachine? Is it
possible? This mathematical problem also involves studying the greatest
amount of first order uncomputable functions that can be relativized to be-
come sub-uncomputable. If this Turing submachine is possible, a negative
Turing degree can be defined. Moreover, as for each Turing submachine
UP ’T there is always another more powerful and non-reducible submachine
UP ’’T such that P ’’T is sufficient computation time to compute BB
+
P ’T ,
so it would likewise be possible to create an infinite hierarchy of negative
Turing degrees.
To what extent can a computer be made to “behave”, in relation to one
of its subcomputers, as if it was a hypercomputer?
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